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a b s t r a c t
Ribstein’s account of the perilous times ahead for “Big Law” mentions “deprofessionalization” as one of
the major risks for the legal profession. Deprofessionalization involves the substitution of standardized
practices and protocols for existing methods of production of professional services. This article examines
and compares the extent to which the advances in both techniques will speed deprofessionalization in
both medicine and law.
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1. The Indefatigable Mr. Ribstein
I did not know Larry Ribstein as well as I should have, nor as
well as many participants at this Conference. Sadly, however, it
is now past the time that I can repair that gap in my own personal relationships. But one did not need to know Larry all that
well to know of his huge output, his legendary work ethic, and his
unrivaled knowledge of his ﬁeld of business organizations, broadly
conceived. He was a careful, meticulous, and inventive scholar who
left no stone unturned, and who produced a dizzying array of articles, treatises, and blogs that left everyone agog. His command of
his subject matter was second to none. Find a topic on which he had
paid his dues, and you could be sure that all the relevant literature
was absorbed, understood, applied, and extended in his writing.
Being well-aware of his encyclopedic knowledge and output, it is
a risky venture to attempt to write anything on a topic on which
he has opined. Nonetheless, the occasion calls for efforts in this
direction, and I shall hope to comply.
One of the major areas Ribstein mastered is the study of the
modern big law ﬁrms, on which his attitudes had altered over time.
In his 1998 article, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, Ribstein stressed the legal constraints that prevented law ﬁrms
from getting larger.1 He duly noted that the inability of ﬁrms to
admit nonlegal partners limited their ability to acquire the equity
capital needed to grow. He further noted that the nonwaivable
duties of supervisory liability further limited ﬁrm size, and that
their inability to enforce noncompete covenants tended to limit
their ability to develop their brand-name capital. He might have
added that the need to avoid conﬂicts often shrinks the size of law

ﬁrms so that they tend to take sides in the kinds of work they do,
as with plaintiff and defendant ﬁrms in tort cases.2
Ribstein’s article was written at the onset of the large growth
cycle for major law ﬁrms that extended for a decade. During that
period, the industry growth far exceeded the growth levels in the
general economy. That relationship has held true even after the
adverse events that took place following the ﬁnancial implosion of
2008.3 That implosion has of course wrought major changes in large
ﬁrms, which have on balance worked hard to maintain their general position even at the cost of shedding lawyers to do so. These
changes, however, did bring forth from Ribstein a decidedly less
optimistic response on the stability of large law ﬁrms by drawing
attention to certain long term difﬁculties with ﬁrm structure that,
in all likelihood, will persist even after the economy perks up. The
change in the legal landscape was accurately chronicled and documented with relentless thoroughness in his elegant Wisconsin Law
Review article, grimly entitled The Death of Big Law.4 There, he sets
out the many pressures that he believes have led, and will continue
to lead, to the steady and near inexorable decline in big ﬁrm practice
of the past decade.5 In dealing with this issue, Ribstein combines
work from a large number of separate ﬁelds to help explain why
the practice of big ﬁrm law has changed as much as it has.
To set the stage for my analysis of the deprofessionalization of
both law and medicine, it is useful to mention just some of the
factors that Ribstein advances to account for the phenomenon. He
notes that the increased competition from legal providers of all
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sorts has placed a real pressure on the high fee structures that these
ﬁrms have needed to support their overhead.6 He understands that
the brand name value of a ﬁrm falls under pressure when potential
users of legal services can get reliable information about the quality of individual lawyers, independent of ﬁrm reputation. In many
areas, this phenomenon in turn leads to fewer bulk purchasers of
legal services, such that the days where X law ﬁrm did all the work
for Y major corporation are now over. Legal services in major corporations have become proﬁt centers of their own, which transforms
whether, and if so how, a corporate general counsel staff hires outside lawyers. The newer practices tend therefore to use different
ﬁrms for different specializations. If there are volume purchases
with a given ﬁrm, they tend to be in the same area, such as insurance
defense work, so that parties can realize economies of scale.7
The exact determinants of the choice to stay inside or go outside
are hard to pinpoint.8 But it is surely the case that it is often easier, especially with modern communications and transportation, to
bring in-house work of a somewhat routine (and thus repetitive)
nature, where the ﬁrm’s full time lawyers can easily carry over the
skills that they acquire from one case to the next. Outside lawyers
are thus reserved for those large, unique, and complex cases that
inside staff is not equipped to handle on its own. That new allocation of responsibility has worked well for ﬁrms like Cravath, Swaine
& Moore because of its “go-to” status for complex litigation.9 But
there are few ﬁrms that enjoy that status, and even in those ﬁrms,
the clear message is that expertise and experience matter the most.
The large bonus awards were given to the senior associates, for it
appears that “Clients are no longer interested in paying for ﬁrst and
second-year associates,”10 for the simple reason that they are not
seen as sources of potential value to them. The tough-minded attitude from clients in turn puts greater pressure on big ﬁrms who
now have to deal with peak and valley problems that arise when
one piece of major litigation settles, perhaps unexpectedly. To give
but one recent illustration, the winding down of the BP litigation
that resulted from the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in
major layoffs (so I have been told) at Kirkland & Ellis, which had
defended these cases.
Indeed, somewhat to my chagrin, Ribstein noted the phenomenon that I will write about in this paper in the section of his
Big Law article that he entitles, “The Deprofessionalization of Law
Practice.”11 In dealing with this topic, Ribstein stresses the constant
pressure that multijurisdictional practice places on the traditional
state function of licensing laws. As large clients are constantly
involved in litigation that crosses jurisdictions, local licensing laws
constantly force ﬁrms to engage in the inefﬁcient practice of hiring
local lawyers (which may well be needed for all sorts of reasons)
for appearances in local courts. The effort to circumvent these costs

According to an annual survey concluded at the end of September 2009, the top
250 law ﬁrms lost 5259, or 4 percent, of their lawyers, including 8.7 percent of their
associates; 15 of the top 75 law ﬁrms dropped more than 100 lawyers each. It was by
far the worst decline in the thirty years of the survey. Law ﬁrms disclosed that they
laid off 12,196 people in 2009, including 4633 lawyers and 7563 staff. Another survey
at the end of 2009 found that 40 percent of big law ﬁrms had reduced associate
starting pay, 44 percent were considering doing so in 2010, while 60 percent of the
ﬁrms had deferred associate start dates in 2009, and 43 percent expected to do so
in 2010. Law ﬁrm instability reached the partner ranks, as a record number of 2775
partners left or joined Am Law 200 ﬁrms in 2010, a 10.6-percent increase in partner
mobility over the previous year (internal citations omitted). Ribstein (2010).
6
Ribstein (2010).
7
See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the
Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 Conn. Ins.
L.J. 205 (1997–1998) (discussing commoditized legal services and the ethics of “ﬂatfee” arrangements).
8
Ribstein (2010).
9
See Jones (2012).
10
Jones (2012).
11
Ribstein (2010).
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contributes to the pressure to hire in-house lawyers “for important
legal advice,” which in turn “erodes lawyers’ distinct professional
status.”12 I have no doubt that Ribstein is correct in the general
observation that local licensing laws create ever greater dislocations with the rise of national, and even global, legal practice.
In this article, however, I do not use the term deprofessionalization of law, and the parallel phenomenon in medicine, in the same
sense as Ribstein. In this instance, I have yoked medicine because
the comparisons between the two ﬁelds are instructive. Law and
medicine differ so much in their modes of organization, the reliance
on technical advances, and the nature of their client base that it is
tempting to expect that there are few common themes that touch
both ﬁelds. One gaping difference, for instance, relates to the competence level of clients and patients. Lawyers, particularly big ﬁrm
lawyers, deal with individual employees of major corporations, all
of whom are at the top of their game. Anyone with personal shortcomings exits the scene either voluntarily or involuntarily so that a
person with greater competence takes his or her place. That option
is effectively foreclosed in medical situations. In some cases, people
who need care have never been competent to take care of themselves. In other instances, difﬁcult decisions are forced inexorably
upon individuals whose competence has been impaired by illness,
old age, or both. In some cases, they have foreknowledge of the situation, and have to choose some mix of speciﬁc advance directives,
or the creation of revocable powers of attorney. Ultimately, some
authority can and must be delegated down, but the entire system
of medical ethics takes on a very different cast as people struggle to
ﬁgure out what kind of agency relationships should be put in place
for individuals who today know that they might not be ﬁt to handle
matters tomorrow.
Nonetheless, in spite of all these differences on the consumer
end of the market, the providers of legal and health care services both depend, as Ribstein has noted, on the ability of ﬁrms
to substitute in inputs of lower costs for the higher professional
talent in question. Ribstein hit that phenomenon on the head for
legal services by noting, “At the low-cost end of the legal services
market, legal software and other new technologies are squeezing small law ﬁrms and sole practitioners.”13 Those trends have
been documented in some detailed by Benjamin Barton in his
discussion of how new technologies invoked by new companies
such as LegalZoom, which advertises “Affordable. Personalized.
Protection.”14 and RocketLawyer, promising “Everything you need
to make it legal,”15 are altering the practice of law at the bottom
end of the market.16 The transformation, moreover, has not been
conﬁned to technologies that allow for drafting standardized documents of all sorts. It may have additional functions as well. The
ability to use these computer systems to handle, for example, ediscovery, could amount to a huge transformation of legal practice,
not only in small ﬁrms, but also in large ones. With digitized documents, this transformation may be only a few short keystrokes
away.17 Nor is there anything that conﬁnes the next generation of
technical information to rote tasks. Matters of strategy and judgment are commonly thought to rest on informed intuition. But as
has happened as well with medicine, strong algorithms and protocols could vastly expand their potential use. The more elementary
forms of technical innovation may have their strongest impact at
the bottom end of the market. But these other technologies could
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See, e.g., Georgetown Law Students Challenge Tradition by Building Online
Legal Advisors with Neota Logic, http://www.prweb.com/releases/neotalogic/
irontechlawyer/prweb9438690.htm.
13

66

R.A. Epstein / International Review of Law and Economics 38 (2014) 64–76

well see a reversal in polarity, to the point where they become
essential tools for large law ﬁrms and their clients in both the transactional or litigation work of the major law ﬁrms, which are at the
opposite end of the market. For the moment at least, these nascent
changes address only a small portion of the broader topic that I
wish to discuss, which is how deprofessionalization profoundly
inﬂuences all segments of professional services, from the top to
the bottom.
In order to pursue these themes, I shall proceed as follows. In
Part II of this paper, I shall offer some brief remarks about the
deﬁnition of a professional and the circumstances under which
their services are demanded. In so doing, I shall posit a model that
has to respond to two competing pressures. The ﬁrst of these is
the constant effort to deprofessionalize services that are currently
provided. The second is the constant effort to innovate with new
services for which professionalization is, at least in the early stages
of the cycle, necessarily required. As Daniel Currell and Todd Henderson note, in one sense the key question is whether Big Law ﬁrms
will remain the prime contractor or whether they will be reduced
to commoditized services for which they can only recover a relatively low competitive rate, which would profoundly upend their
market.18
The major law ﬁrms in the United States are well aware of the
risk, and thus continue to take strenuous efforts to update their
portfolios so that they can deal with a wide range of scientiﬁc
and technical issues that would have fallen outside their scope
years ago. Benjamin Barton quotes the historian Norman F. Cantor (my own legal history teacher at Columbia College in 1963)
for the proposition that “A London barrister of 1500 would need
only a few months of remedial education to step into an American courtroom to today.”19 That might be true if the question is
the extent to which actions for conversion and detinue overlap,
but it misses entirely the essential role that modern lawyers have
to play in understanding the complexities of modern business and
preparing expert witnesses on subject matter areas that were completely unknown at that time. In one sense only does the profession
of law remain as it was in 1500—a ﬁeld that gives ample scope to
general intelligence. But it is hardly a ﬁeld that can practice on an
information base that is over 500 years old.
The pace of change in the external world does not leave the
practice of law unaffected. Rather, the result is an equilibrium in
which the professional class constantly absorbs new functions as it
is displaced from older ones, so that the key question is the relative
strength of these two phenomena. In Part III of this paper, I shall
look at the pressures for deprofessionalization in medicine, and
then reject the proposition that the cost savings standardization
devices identiﬁed in Part II pose any undue risk of monopoly power
that calls for new layers of government regulation. In Part IV, I apply
the same analysis to the legal services. Part V then addresses the
implications that deprofessionalization has on medical and legal
education. Part VI concludes by arguing that however momentous these changes, they require no distinctive form of government
intervention to either strike down or boost up ﬁrms whose position
has been altered by the deprofessionalization process.
2. The cycle of professionalism
The ﬁrst written assignment for my freshman English Composition Class with Professor A. Kent Hieatt,20 a ﬁne teacher, was to
give a deﬁnition of the word “professional.” As I recall, no one in the
class did very well with this assignment. Since that time I remain
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Cantor (1997), quoted in Barton (2013).
Sauer (2009).

bothered by my youthful inability to provide a workable deﬁnition of the term even though I have spent my entire life in one of
the learned professions: the law. My Microsoft Word On-line Thesaurus gives as the equivalents to “professional” the terms “expert”
and “specialist,” and surely there is some overlap between the two
sets of terms. But that connection is less than precise. It is possible to be an expert in cooking or woodcutting and while many
would regard these ﬁelds as professional, none, I think, would classify them as learned professionals. It is also possible to specialize
with great proﬁciency in all manner of manual trades that no matter
how laudable, no one would regard as professionals, learned or otherwise. The same level of imperfect overlap goes to such words as
“qualiﬁed,” “proﬁcient,” “skilled,” and “trained,” all of which pertain
to the notion of profession, but never quite deﬁne it.
So what else is needed to capture the term? The ﬁrst observation
seems simple, almost trite: the professional is one who professes to
know something. That term too can easily have negative connotations, but in its positive sense the only people who can profess are
those who have something to say about a given ﬁeld, so that they do
more than practice it. They also can explain to both students and
general audiences how their particular ﬁeld is put together. The
second part of that deﬁnition is that there must be something to
profess about. If a ﬁeld is cut and dried so that a clear protocol can
displace the element of judgment in working on a particular problem, then the ﬁeld will start to decline in prestige and lose some of
its professional aura. Put otherwise, the notion of a profession carries with it the implication that the professional is someone who
can bring critical judgment to solve a problem that has never quite
been presented in that form before. We do not trust amateurs to
make these kinds of judgments, which is one reason why we pay
the professionals to do their work. A professional who never gets
paid for his or her services is something of a rarity, albeit not a
contradiction in terms.
It is therefore a ﬁne state of affairs for any person to be able to
command the respect and income that comes with excelling in a
particular profession. But at the same time, what is good for the professional is in one sense bad for the society as a whole. As Benjamin
Barton puts it: “America as a whole will be signiﬁcantly better off
if we spend less on legal services.”21 Once the ﬁrm picks up the initial tab, it passes on to consumers the hefty fees that professionals
demand for their exercise of skill and judgment. That individual or
ﬁrm in turn has to incorporate those fees in their costs for goods
or service in some downstream market. If there is no alternative, it
is better to pay a large fee to a professional than to suffer a greater
loss by making the wrong decision. But in the long term, what markets try to do is to reduce professional judgment to standardized
commodities that can then be bought and sold at low prices, with
no loss in reliability.
Putting all the pieces together, we come up with this complex
process that new technology and external shocks always leave in
a continuous state of partial disequilibrium. At one point in the
cycle, professionals are critical to the development of new ﬁelds
and disciplines that would otherwise be outside the circle of human
knowledge. In these areas, the level of data is thin, the technology
or practice is in a rapid state of ﬂux, so that professional judgment
is needed to apply a body of principles to a particular case in its own
distinctive setting. But later on in the cycle, that form of innovation
is no longer needed, so that the second wave of innovation takes
over with very different purposes. Those activities that at one time
could only be done by professionals become targets of opportunities for other individuals who commoditize those services so that,
by deﬁnition, they receive only a competitive rate of return off a far
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lower cost basis. At this point, the nature of the next business task
is to ﬁnd a way to reproduce with reliability the new advantages of
the innovation in mass markets. In order to do this, some high level
of standardization becomes key to make the model work.
In many legal circles the term “standard” often has undeservedly negative connotations, as in the phrase “standard form
contracts,” which then get derided as contracts of adhesion, which
is the process whereby standardization becomes an issue of
monopolization.22 But it is wrong to begin the analysis with a
concern with monopolization, which can only arise when there
is collusion between parties of sufﬁcient market share. Standardization also has immense beneﬁts in competitive markets, where
it eases the burdens on customers in comparing potential trading
partners.
It is therefore important to note that this move toward commoditization produces such large gains in virtually all sectors of
the economy, of which the professions are only one. The ﬁrst of
these advantages is that standardization reduces the costs of implementation for similar and repetitive tasks. Put in other terms, any
standardized improvement is likely to be scalable, so that its effectiveness is not reduced as the institutions or practices to which they
apply increase in size. Think of the costs of training as a ﬁxed cost
that could be spread out over large numbers of separate units. As
that number gets sufﬁciently large, as it does with products used
in mass markets, the costs of setting up the standard or protocol
become an ever smaller portion of the total cost of the total operation. Standardized techniques allow for more uniform treatment of
customers and clients, which reduces uneasiness about favoritism.
At the same time, the per unit savings on each of the standardized outcomes become ever larger, so that the standardized ﬁrm is
now in the enviable position of having, as volume increases, fewer
costs and greater beneﬁts on a per piece basis. More speciﬁcally,
standardization reduces the cost of training personnel to do particular procedures, because many people can be trained at one time.
Since the procedures in question are standardized, it leads to a
higher level of interoperability of personnel who are assembled into
teams, such that if one person becomes sick or unreliable, someone else who is trained to do the same functions can replace the
ailing team member. Thus standardization carries with it reduced
costs for equipment and supply, by allowing for volume purchases,
which almost always carry with them a volume discount as well.
The advantages of standardization are not only relevant to the
static situation, but they have positive dynamic consequences as
well. Let one portion of a complex set of interactions stabilize, and
it reduces the uncertainty for the operation of a larger system as
a whole. In addition, once the standardization has taken place, it
is easier to make piecemeal improvements of the overall scheme
by replacing one separable element in the current system while
leaving other pieces of the process unchanged. This form of modularization is ever more potent in system designs for intellectual
property or indeed for other processes as well. The ability to make
improvements in one area without compromising the effectiveness of other areas removes the management problems dealing
with indivisibilities,23 thereby making it possible to keep overall improvements in a system where there are uneven rates of
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improvement in the various constituent components of the overall
program.
This process of innovation has powerful implications for the
distribution of knowledge within a system that operates on these
standardized insights. The key point here is that standardization
leads to a concentration of expertise at the highest levels where
these systems are designed, tested, and implemented. The very
decision to adopt a single standard for an entire system is not without a substantial downside. Any single common mode error can
now take down large numbers of otherwise separate operations.
The risk of a kind of failure cannot be dismissed out of hand, for
all it takes for a program to fail is for it to miss some “unknown
unknown” over which it is no longer possible to check against risk.
Standardization plays an important role in routine transactions because it allows lawyers to draw on clauses that have been
litigated or tested in previous cases so that their meaning is ascertained. A large ﬁrm data base means that the next agreement starts
as a composition of earlier agreements, which can then be modiﬁed
in particular cases. This modularization, moreover, becomes really
critical whenever a given party wants to obtain some of its services
from one provider and the remainder from others. A standardized
system allow for a coherent carve-out from the larger area without
creating one of two risks, namely gaps and overlaps in the basic
arrangements. Yet by the same token standardization allows—as in
mortgage markets—for the assembly of large portfolios drawn from
different sources, which allows for diversiﬁcation of risks across
geographical locations.24 But there is a down side to all sensible
arrangement, because diversiﬁcation on one dimension need not
mean a diversiﬁcation on all dimensions. Large portfolios may be
subject to regulatory risk. But it is critical to note that the risk of
danger will only slow down the process, not stop it altogether. In
the end mass production is cheaper than handicrafts, both for widgets and documents. The same risks are possible in dealing with
all other kinds of standardized products from software programs
to professional work dealing with either law or medicine, which
only puts a greater premium on the need for real expertise at the
center to stress test the various new protocols to the extent that
is humanly possible. But once this is understood, it only reinforces
the need to get top-drawer talent at the center in order to devise
and install simpler techniques that can be used by less expensive
personnel on the ground. Standardization generates large rewards
for those at the center who design the institutions, but reduces the
revenues for those on the periphery who implement those systems.
3. Professionalism in medicine
The forces of deprofessionalization are at work inside medicine
for reasons that closely follow those that work elsewhere in the
economy. Put otherwise, professionals always like to deﬁne themselves in opposition to business or industry, because by their own
lights professionals are not bound in their daily lives by the grubby
norms of the marketplace in which people deal with each other at
arm’s length and have no compunction about looking out solely for
their own interest. But that short analysis is wrong in both directions, for there are parts of the professional’s life that are run by
business norms, and part of the business person’s life that are run by
professional norms, chieﬂy those that relate to ﬁduciary duties—an
evocative but indispensable term in dealing with human relationships. Thus it is clearly correct for professionals to deal at arm’s
length with potential patients when negotiating salary or terms
of employment with a practice, hospital, or clinic. In many cases,
they will have agents or assistants to do that part of the job so that
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they can devote their personal energies to the caretaking side of
the relationships, and, increasingly, only to the most difﬁcult and
delicate parts of that job. It is, of course, not correct when people
are in positions of dependence to recommend unnecessary surgery
in what would otherwise be a manifest case of self-dealing.
Indeed, the risk of self-dealing in this business often arises in
yet another context, where physicians provide lab tests and similar
services through their own related businesses. In these instances,
it is very difﬁcult to come up with a coherent policy that ﬁts all
cases.25 A total ban on these self-referrals could result in the loss of
efﬁciencies that come from close working relations. A case-by-case
analysis cannot work well in situations with a huge number of small
dollar transactions but per se legality opens the door to overcharging, especially when third party providers are involved. It is not
possible to resolve this ongoing struggle here, but it is instructive
to compare it brieﬂy with similar conﬂicts of interest from selfdealing with respect to legal and business services. This conﬂict of
interest also arises in the corporate context, where persons who
have taken a position of trust—a director or ofﬁcer or a corporation, for example—lose the protection of the business judgment rule
when they engage in self-dealing transactions; that is, transactions
between related parties.26 In those cases, the correct standard for
evaluating the transaction is one of “entire fairness,” which means
that the burden is on the defendant to show that the transaction is
advantageous to each side, if one person is in a conﬂict of interest
position by sitting on both sides of the table.27 The relative importance of these ﬁduciary duties are likely to differ between medicine
and business, for self-dealing in business contexts is likely to come
with a few major transactions, not with many little ones. The application of these principles vary within as well, as across types, but
the central principles used in sorting different cases are identical in both ﬁelds of endeavor, although their application is apt to
differ.
In particular, there is nothing about work in professional settings that is at variance with the two-stage process of innovation set
out above. The advent of any new technology brings with it risks
and opportunities that only experts can handle. In this early stage,
they iron out the bugs in the new technique; they ﬁnd new applications for their use; and they train support staff to help and work
with suppliers and ancillary personnel to improve quality control
on key inputs; and they train other experts to follow in their footsteps. The success of the ﬁrst period initiative, moreover, quickly
leads to the second stage response, as the demand for their services is reduced precisely because, with time and experience, the
new and improved information and skills they possess are more
likely to be shared by others. It no longer takes a professional to
perform an EKG or a pregnancy test, and the clearer parameters
make it easier to interpret the results once they are collected. Medical professionals, in a word, are not immune to the pressures of
standardization that apply everywhere else in the economy. The
ability to reduce complex tasks to routine tasks, which can be performed at lower cost and with greater reliability, by machines or
nonprofessionals, if possible, is an essential part of the innovation
cycle in all lines of endeavor.
Here is one simple example. Over ﬁfty years ago, all tests were
done on an individualized basis, which led to subtle forms of inaccuracy that came from the variation of performance standards in
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For a recent discussion of the applicable principles, see In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder
Litig., 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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However, it should be noted that self-dealing in the business transaction setting
can be, and very frequently is, approved through formal ratiﬁcation by a majority of
disinterested directors. Formal ratiﬁcation preserves the business’s entitlement to
the business judgment rule in most contexts. See 8 Del. C. ¸141(a)(1) (2010).

such routine tests as pipetting and diluting solutions. The technicians who did this work therefore had to have solid and consistent
skills in order to control for the subtle errors—sometimes fatal—that
could creep into the system out of inattention and fatigue. The
rise of larger machines that could collect and process blood and
urine samples radically transformed that portion of the business
by allowing institutions to hire at lower salary workers to operate
the new equipment that, as it were, did the thinking for them. That
form of deprofessionalization did not intrude on the prerogatives
of the medical establishment as such because the displaced persons
never had a powerful seat at the highest levels of management in
hospitals, clinics, and medical ofﬁces around the land.
The threat to the professional stature of physicians became more
direct now that management skills and technical prowess progressed to the point where it made it possible to standardize other
tasks which were traditionally reserved for the professional judgment of senior medical personnel—people who typically enjoy the
kind of political clout within their organizations that enable them
to resist managerial oversight. It is also under greater pressure
because it is likely that the anticipated expansion of government
involvement will place enormous pressures on doctors to delegate out some tasks to non- professional sources.28 It would,
however, be wrong to think that the introduction of government
controls is the only problem in this area. There are frequent cases
of medical resistance to all sorts of innovation, even on matters far
removed from modern cost-containment efforts. Thus, this type of
tension is an old one in medicine, dating back at the very least
to the days of Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–1865), who met with
ﬁerce and diabolical resistance from professional surgeons for his
insistence on antiseptic procedures in hospitals, most particularly
in childbirth, that reduced mortality rates from between 10 and
35 percent to 1 percent when consistently employed.29 The reason for the successful resistance stemmed in large measure from
the collective resistance of the of the medical profession, especially in Europe, brought on, I suspect, by two reasons: ﬁrst its
rigidly hierarchical system of authority, which often times results
in cartel-like behavior; and second the absence of a coherent
(germ) theory that could explain why the treatment was needed.
Making these changes requires, some form of a supermajority
vote which is hard to obtain when both of these conditions are
present.
One might hope that such overt resistance to technical change
would be taboo today, but in fact it is not. The explanations today
may not be as strong as they once were, but they are still here at
least in some circumstances. The issue is one that presents genuine difﬁculty, if (as one referee suggests) cartel-like behavior lay
at the root of the problem, given that the rate of conversion varies
rapidly with the kind of practice that is involved. In dealing with
some medical customs, a single good study could turn over practice
quite rapidly. Such was the case with retrolental ﬁbroplasia, now
retinopathy of prematurity. Around 1950, increase in the use of oxygen for premature babies created a new epidemic of the disease,
which promptly was brought under control when good clinical
studies pointed out the danger and led to a lowering of oxygen
levels.30 In line with this, various organizations like the National
Comprehensive Cancer Network do rapid updates on protocols
based on recent information, which thus make it more puzzling
why pockets of resistance to medical information remain.
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In one of the great accounts of professional resistance to medical innovation, The Checklist,31 Atul Gawande, a gifted professional
surgeon and medical commentator, chronicles in great detail the
vivid contrast between two forms of medical intervention. The
ﬁrst involves a set of unimaginable heroics done to bring back,
almost literally, from the dead a person who developed raging sepsis in hospital. But such dramatic episodes can misdirect thinking
about patient care. Why? Because, at a tiny cost, using only sterile catheters as prescribed, under sterile conditions. Nonetheless it
appears as though individual professionals don’t take the time to
properly drape a site, or wash it with proper antiseptics and the
like.
could stop these infections in the ﬁrst place, just as in Semmelweis’s time. Here is Gawande’s take: “I.C.U.’s put ﬁve million lines
into patients each year, and national statistics show that, after ten
days, four per cent of those lines become infected.”32 That works
out to 200,000 cases of infection that can be prevented by following simple precautions, which when implemented drive the
infection rate from that source to close to zero. That cost-beneﬁt
ratio is a lot better for modest systemic improvements than for
heroic medical interventions, which sometimes keep patients alive
but often with lifetime disabilities. And yet compliance levels, especially outside the ICU with standard protocols like hand washing by
all levels of medical personnel—physicians, nurses, technicians and
the like—remain low.
The moral here offers an objective lesson on the critical difference between the management and legal approach to medical
malpractice. Lawyers, like folk heroes, gravitate toward examining
the ins and outs of complex cases up on appellate review, which
make it that far solely because they are so close to the line.33 But the
real task in the management of medical malpractice lies in developing a set of protocols in the hospital or clinic setting, which, at very
low cost, prevents these events from occurring in the ﬁrst place.
The correct management response to malpractice, therefore, is to
institutionalize standard protocol at the lower levels of stafﬁng to
prevent against dumb errors that occur all too often for routine
procedures (like inserting lines, dosing patients, or typing blood),
where even a single error has disastrous consequences. Indeed,
owing to the real risk of contagion in this area, direct regulation
of some elementary norms is not out of the question, as it falls
into the core area of health and safety, where protection of third
persons is at stake. But it is an open question as to why with the
extensive regulation already in place, this topic, which should be
close to the top of the risk falls to the bottom. Why then the delay?
One suggestion (made by a second referee) is that it is the monopoly
power of physicians that again prevents the changes in question.
But that proposal does not ring true here. The standard monopolist
will take the rents in compensation and will not impose an inefﬁcient set of work rules from which both sides lose. Nor is it clear
that the physicians have any power, given the extensive control
that management teams have over the operation of their hospitals, and competitive environment in which they operate. Yet the
extent to which these changeovers are matters of direct government regulation, state or federal, it becomes still more difﬁcult to
evaluate
So once again, it looks as though garden variety implementation issues are at the core of the problem. It is in just this context
that two elements of a successful response come together: protocol and management reversal of the professional hierarchy. Both
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these were at the center of Gawande’s account of the evolution of
the checklist. The practice began in aviation, with a test of the Boeing Bomber that eventually became the Flying Fortress, or B-17, a
mainstay in the air war against Germany in World War II. The initial trial of the plane in 1935, then called the Model 299, resulted
in disaster when the plane crashed shortly after takeoff, killing two
out of ﬁve on board, including its expert pilot Major Ployer V. Hill.
34 Here was a case where expertise failed under novel conditions.
Yet more intensive pilot training was unlikely to lead pilots to make
better snap judgments during ﬂight. It is not just a question of getting most of the steps right most of the time. If there is one mistake
in the sequence, further compensating adjustments become necessary on the spur of the moment. No one has instincts strong enough
to prevent disaster even in a small fraction of cases.
Enter the checklist. Since there is no way to correct an airplane
once it has entered its death cycle, it is imperative to make certain
that it does not deviate from its true course at all. The checklist in
effect required the pilot to follow strict instructions for all critical
transitions. Do the same thing every time, so as to avoid the need to
improvise at the back end. Keeping to protocol increases safety in
ﬂight in the short run. In the long run, it inﬂuences both the selection and training of pilots in accordance with the maxim, “There
are old pilots and bold pilots, but there are no old, bold pilots.” The
checklist, which depends on the centralized creation of a standard
operating procedure, thus displaces pilot intuition on how best to
ﬂy airplanes. Once in place on the prototype of the B-17, it reduced
the error rate during testing to 0.0 percent over 1.8 million miles,
all back in the 1930s.35
The same dynamic happens in medicine, where the restless
ghost of Semmelweis still walks hospital corridors at night, given
that compliance rates with hand washing are still low. Gawande
tells of the tireless efforts of Dr. Peter Pronovost to introduce simple
protocols into Sinai-Grace Hospital, a huge facility located in Detroit
which serves an enormous inner city population. Sinai-Grace ran a
high infection rate until Pronovost got management to implement
a simple and relentless set of rules on cleanliness. Critically, their
enforcement was not left to the whims of doctors, but to the nurse
staff, which had the power to call in top management to stop any
procedure when doctors did not comply.36 The result was the drop
in the ten-day infection rate from 11 per cent to zero, and similar
levels of improvement in all other standard statistical measures.37
For changes of this sort, there is no need to resort to complex
statistical models to weigh the effectiveness of the change. The
difﬁculties here are not cognitive. They are institutional. And if the
correct protocols are consistently followed, as a ﬁrst approximation, the demand for emergency room doctors should fall, while
the demand for the purveyors of routine services should increase.
The one counter effect in this story is that the reduction of infection
could induce physicians to attempt risky procedures that might
have proved futile if the infection risk had remained uncontrolled.
But even if that point is true—and I expect that it is—the general
effect should be regarded as positive, for a risky procedure is better
than a certain death. In any event, the impact of these cases on
overall safety risks is likely to be vanishingly small. The relative
magnitudes tell the institutional tale. The routine cases of infection
that due care will eliminate dominate exotic ones by a 1000 to
1 ratio. On that assumption any increased demand to undertake
risker procedures in this safer environment will be tiny compared to
the savings from getting routine cases right. And as an institutional
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matter, the rate of return from washing hands and gloving are
so much higher than those from hi-tech rescue operations that it
becomes pretty clear where the balance of convenience should lie.
The deprofessionalization of medicine inﬂuences other types
of standardized procedures. Back in the 1950s Dr. Peter Safar
pioneered a three-step procedure for cardio pulmonary resuscitation: clearing airways, by lifting the chin and tilting the head,
using mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, and following with chest
compressions.38 Thus the success rate in saving lives on the battleﬁeld during the recent Iraqi war depended heavily on the
introduction of new protocols that covered every stage of medical treatment from initial contact to ﬁnal treatment, resulting in a
vast in increase in lives saved.39 The innovations start on the battleﬁeld when medics ﬁrst encounter wounded soldiers. Red blood
is a sign of danger, and the natural intuition is to stanch the bleeding ﬁrst. Big mistake. The loss of oxygen kills a lot more rapidly
than the loss of blood, so that the key instruction is to introduce an
invariable protocol ﬁrst to secure the airway before dealing with
any vivid loss of blood.40 It sounds simple once you say it, but the
point was missed in countless wars because no one at command
central took it upon himself to think about the question and then
spread the right protocol down the chain of command, in ways that
military operations can do far better than hospitals.
It should not, however, be supposed that the deprofessionalization of medicine only deals with the standard operating procedures
that lurk at the heart of medicine. They also deal with many key
questions of diagnosis that are quite amenable to the same centralization of knowledge and the creation of protocol.41 In unpacking
this relationship, it is critical to understand the tripartite relationship among intuition, custom, and protocol. The common thread
among the three lies in their approach to imperfect information.
Rather than embark on an exhaustive review of the large number of
factors that go into making complete and accurate judgments, these
three techniques share the common premise that the isolation of
a few key features will tend to produce more accurate decisions
by economizing on decision costs. The intuitionist focuses in on
one or two features and makes judgments about what diagnosis to
make or what procedure to follow. The rest of the information is
left on the cutting room ﬂoor. The system of custom depends, as
it were, on the collective judgments of many individuals through
their pattern of interactions. The use of custom thus represents
an accumulated deposit of wisdom that allows people to coordinate their behavior with each other even when there are no direct
relations among themselves. The constant hit and miss technique
allows for constant corrections from the original pattern without
centralized coordination. It is easy for people like Hayek to praise
this decentralized system as the best way to organize complex
commercial markets.42
The key defect of these techniques is that they resist systematic
veriﬁcation, so that the intuition and custom could easily lead
to high error rates that resist rapid corrections. The system of
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protocol shares the fundamental belief that the best decisions are
made by focusing on a small set of the relevant variables. But far
from resting on intuition, the choice of key variables from a very
long list depends heavily on close review of outcomes in closed
ﬁles to measure which combination of variables produces the
reliable result. In this sense, a well-chosen protocol depends on a
centralized evaluation that is missing in both custom and intuition.
The question then arises whether this technique puts to shame
the decentralized system of judgments praised by small government types. The answer to this question is no. Centralized authority
only means that a complex organization collects and analyzes the
data. But that agency need not be a government. It could be a single
hospital with a large set of cases, or an HMO or other voluntary organization that has the same access to multiple cases. Indeed there is
much to be said for using the largest possible data sets if there is
some effective way to make sure that the information sets so collected do not get diverted to anti competitive uses, which may not
be possible, at which point the gains from sharing date with a large
health care network may get most of the needed information with
a far smaller business risk. Different institutions can compete over
the choice of protocols like they compete on any other dimension.
Indeed it could well be that with different populations, the protocol
that works with one institution need not do as well with a second,
so that some variation could emerge especially at the earlier stages
of the process.
These private protocols, moreover, will normally be protected
to some degree at least by trade secret law, which normally would
not be invoked to protect any government data base that is seeking
to establish in form of oversight over market activities. The major
control device at the federal level is the Independent Payment Advisory Board, whose basic charge is to bring the level of Medicare
spending back to predetermined target levels when the Medicare
actuary projects that they will exceed target levels. 43 It is not clear
that IPAB will have to power to subdivide responses by ﬁrm type,
location, patient population or any other relevant consideration.
Nor is it obvious how IPAB could discharge its control mission
without engaging in some form of rationing, which as a statutory matter is inconsistent with its critical mandate: “The proposal
shall not include any recommendation to ration health care, raise
revenues or Medicare beneﬁciary premiums.., increase Medicare
beneﬁciary cost sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and
co-payments), or otherwise restrict beneﬁts or modify eligibility
criteria.”44 The balance of advantage between these the public and
private approaches to innovation is not easy to determine. The
private system will spur the creation of new information, and it
could easily be widely deployed pursuant by sharing agreements
between various private health care organizations. In addition,
some inventors of other similar technologies will choose to place
them in the public domain, if only to prevent others from patenting
them. Public use of protocols will get more rapid dissemination, but
their judgment may be made on collateral cost considerations of the
sort that have prompted so much unease with the use of these proposals in the ﬁrst place. In light of the delicate balancing act that the
IPAB must follow under the PPACA, my own view is that the perils
of government are on this matter greater than those on the private
side, so I would be reluctant to put all the eggs in the governmentside basket. The use of trade secret law, moreover, always allows
the government through independent discovery to publish its own
protocols, even if they duplicate down to the last degree, the trade

43
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, ¸3403, 124 Stat.
489 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. ¸ 1395kkk (2012)).
44
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, ¸ 3403, 124 Stat.
490 (to be codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. ¸ 1899A(c)(2)(A)(ii)).

R.A. Epstein / International Review of Law and Economics 38 (2014) 64–76

secret protocols of private ﬁrms.45 A mixed strategy of private
innovation, coupled with government oversight, therefore seems
preferable to any nation-wide takeover of the entire intellectual
property space by federal ofﬁcials.
Given these multiple pathways to developing uniform standards, it is a mistake to conﬂate, as Hayek often did, the use of
systematic techniques of data analysis with government planning,
which can fall prey to so many other political forces. Within a private setting, new protocols can be both developed and tested, and,
with suitable caution, successful ones can be imitated, just like
those put into place in Sinai-Grace. The important point here is
never to underestimate the gains from following these protocols,
in the domain where they are ﬁrst developed and often beyond.
Malcolm Gladwell offered one key example of how successful
the right protocol can be in his 2005 book Blink, which has the
wrong subtitle, The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. The mistake in this title is that it assumes that intuition, which does work
without thinking, and protocols are cut from the same cloth, when
they are not. The individual who follows the protocol is barred from
independent thought, but the party who designs the protocol has
thought and tested long and hard before settling on the right protocol for a given occasion. One example that Gladwell gives is the
efforts of Drs. Brendan Reilly and Lee Goldman of Cook County Hospital to devise a set of protocols to decide which patients who
present themselves in an emergency room with apparent heart
problems to send home, and which to admit to the ER, often to
intensive care.46 The choice here is a matter of life and death,
with high error costs each way, for admitting a patient who is
not in distress not only imposes high treatment costs, but it also
diverts staff and beds from patients in need of prompt medical
intervention. After hundreds of dry runs, they relied on a threepart test—whether the patient’s pain was unstable angina; whether
there was ﬂuid in the patient’s lungs; and whether the patient’s
systolic blood pressure was below 100. A decision tree, based on
the patient’s ECG and which, if any, of those three risk factors
were positive, determined whether the patient admitted. The protocol outperformed the intuitions of experienced doctors in both
directions, yielding both fewer false positives and fewer false negatives. The implications of this result are profound for the practice
of medicine, not only for the short term costs that it saves, but also
for the long term stafﬁng issues in ERs, where the level of training needed may (other things being equal) trend down because
the level of diagnostic accuracy goes up. To be sure, the treatment
of dangerous cases still requires immense skill, but even here the
introduction of yet other protocols could replicate the advantages
of those used to make the initial patient screening.
The rise of these protocols, generated as they are by large data
sets, has set off extensive ripples within the medical profession. One
competitive advantage of the Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) is that they can organize this data in ways that individual
physicians cannot. This has in part, and in conjunction with the
HMOs’ role as a vehicle for aggregating purchasing power to secure
physician services, lead to the model’s rise in usage and continuing prevalence. The greater knowledge at the center of the ﬁrm
leads to a larger insistence for more control over the decisions made
at the physician level, which in turn leads to strong pressures by
physician groups to resist that encroachment on their traditional
zones of autonomy. That result in turn has led physician groups to
sue their own HMOs to seek to impose heavier liabilities on these
organizations to the extent that they take over the control of dayto-day operations. In one such instance, Petrovich v. Share Health
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Plan of Illinois, Inc.,47 the Illinois State Medical Society ﬁled an amicus brief in which it alleged that the HMO’s right to make decisions
for prospective treatment, and to withhold payment when its dictates are not followed, should expose it to liability for any wrongs
of the practice groups over which they exert control.48 To be sure,
the centralization of control within a complex ﬁrm structure may
lead to some incorrect decisions—although ironically there was no
evidence of that in Petrovich. But these health-care decisions cannot
be judged by looking solely at the suits selected for litigation; one
must also take into account the overall performance levels, where
it seems clear that the shift in the delivery of health care services,
concomitant with the decline of individual fee for service medicine,
indicates that deprofessionalization (which is always a matter of
degree) is taking place already. Clearly this tussle has no easy resolution because the relevant knowledge base is divided between
the two sides. But what drives the physicians is the knowledge that
shared control leads to a reduced professional status, which they
sought to counter by joining forces with patients in suits against
HMOs.
In principle, the best way to deal with all these issues of divided
control is to allocate risk and control through contract, at least in
a competitive market. To be sure health care markets are not uniformly competitive, but that point does not cut against the use of
contractual solution. It is not apparent that there are any monopoly
rents to be extracted by consolidating information at the health
plan level. It does not increase market concentration, but it does
increase performance, so just do it. But there is much political opposition to that proposal, stemming especially from concerns with
medical privacy, that continues to grow apace. In the last presidential campaign, Mitt Romney attacked the ACA on the ground that
it “puts the federal government between you and your doctor.” 49
It is an open question whether Romney would have been equally
opposed to the interposition of the HMO between you and your doctor, by the similar erosion of physician authority. While the ACA has
so many features that are antithetical to a competitive market, the
HMOs do not, which suggests that the fact of intervention in the
long run may be less important than the nature of that intervention. Some oversight is necessary for two reasons: ﬁrst, physicians
have less information than do the plans on key protocols because
they have to rely on data sets that are assembled by others and not
always available. Second it is all too easy for patients and physicians to decide to make expenditures that are beneﬁcial to both,
but which impose excessive costs on the plan, given the inevitable
presence of serious physician-patient conﬂicts. In these situations,
the problem of the lesser evil remains, and it is instructive that no
plan allows that level of discretion, which does come back into the
system with specialized concierge plans where the insurer drops
out of the equation.
The ability to work an effective contractual solution is always
difﬁcult, but it will be unduly limited so long as judges take the
position that “[m]arket forces alone “are insufﬁcient to cure the
deleterious [e]ffects of managed care on the health care industry.”50
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The situation will not get any easier so long as licensing rules allow
the physicians to exert monopoly control over key portions of their
practice. Indeed it may well be that HMOs are not the only, or even
the right, model through which to work the transfer of power away
from professionals. It is well known that emergency room bottlenecks are often acute because the ER has become the place of last
resort for uninsured persons seeking health care. The solution may
well be the use of corporate providers of medical services that can
use protocols at the center to decide which persons can be treated
on-site and which need referral to more intensive modes of examination and treatment. 51 Most people will fall into the ﬁrst category.
If these logistics could work out—and with good protocols there is
every reason to think that they can—it could lead to a welcome
deprofessionalization of medicine on a grand scale as a full complement of physician assistants, technicians, nurses aids, and others
not yet invented help convert expensive medical care into cheaper
health care. The key point here is that these changes cannot be made
within the current regulatory system, so that major circumvention
that requires political action against entrenched interest groups is
necessarily required to realize these savings. 52
The use of major structural reforms to speed the process of
deprofessionalization does not only arise in the private sector.
Indeed, one area in which this form of control is urgently needed
concerns the operation of the large government programs of Medicare and Medicaid, which seem to have lost any ability to run
large systems by breaking complex tasks down into simpler ones.
Gawande addresses this topic too in his recent essay Big Med (a
nice opposition to Ribstein’s Big Law), where he asks why it is that
large health care programs cannot run with the same efﬁciency as
the Cheesecake Factory whose operations he came to admire.53 The
simplest explanation for this is that neither Medicare nor Medicaid
are organized as private ﬁrms that have centralized control over
their internal operations, which they exercise in ways to maximize
proﬁts. They are large government programs whose own guidelines are easily gamed by the hospitals, physicians, and ﬁrms that
do business with them. The key distinction, as noted in the discussion of protocol, is between centralization within the ﬁrm, which
makes sense, and centralization within government, which never
does. Even work done through public institutions can have great
value, as with the studies done at Cook County Hospital, which
succeeded because it acted as a more or less autonomous operation.
Most critically on this matter, size is never the determinant of
how innovation grows. It is whether any market actors face systematic competition from either new or future forms in deciding
when and how to innovate. Gawande, who is no political economist,
misses that point when he introduces a note of pessimism on the
broader implications of the Cheesecake Factory. He thus writes,
somewhat fearfully: “Essentially, we’re moving from a Jeffersonian
ideal of small guilds and independent craftsmen to a Hamiltonian
recognition of the advantages that size and centralized control can
bring.”54 At this point, the lurking danger is as follows:
We have no guarantee that Big Medicine will serve the social
good. Whatever the industry, an increase in size and control
creates the conditions for monopoly, which could do the opposite of what we want: suppress innovation and drive up costs
over time. In the past, certainly, health-care systems that pursued size and market power were better at raising prices than
at lowering them.55

51
52
53
54
55

See Sage (2007), Bohmer (2007).
For other possible reforms, see Epstein and Hyman (2012).
Gawande (2012).
Gawande (2012).
Gawande (2012).

There are never any guarantees in life. But there are better
and worse understandings of organizational behavior. There is, of
course, no question that monopoly drives up costs and reduces the
overall level of consumer surplus and with it, social welfare; the
antitrust implications are clear—these practices should in general
be discouraged unless there are offsetting efﬁciency gains from,
say, a merger that increases market concentration. But no ﬁrm that
currently has a dominant position has some strong desire to refuse
to adopt, let alone suppress, the innovations that help it maintain
its own position against possible entrants who are lurking in the
wings. To be sure, there is some ambiguous evidence that suggests
that “’[w]hen ﬁrms set both price and quality, both the positive
and normative impacts of competition are ambiguous.’ 56 Yet it is
exceedingly difﬁcult to tease out the effects of some uncertain measure of market power on innovation levels from general studies that
address price and quality, given the complex legal environments in
which most major health care providers work. Nor is it the case that
innovation is undertaken by hospitals and other ﬁrms, as opposed
to entrepreneurs working in these markets. At this level, the simple theory looks to be more reliable than the off-point empirical
studies. No ﬁrm with market power should be expected to resist
the adoption of new innovations that could both lower its costs
and increase its proﬁts. Nor does any monopolist reject any new
cost-saving devices that allow it to simultaneously reduce price
and increase proﬁt by bringing additional customers into the fold.
The risk of a monopoly is that it contracts output below the competitive level in order to raise prices above the competitive level,
which can be done through collusion no matter what the level of
technological innovation.
In making this mistake, Gawande oddly enough repeats the
same error made nearly seventy years ago by my own teacher at the
Yale Law School, Friedrich Kessler, who so feared standard-form
contracts, despite all their evident efﬁciencies, that he branded
them as the devil’s best friend:
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate
trend of competitive capitalism toward monopoly, the meaning
of contract has changed radically. Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all members of the
community will be able to make use of it to the same extent.
On the contrary, the law, by protecting the unequal distribution of property does nothing to prevent freedom of contract
from becoming a one-sided privilege. Society, by proclaiming
freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not interfere with
the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract enables
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more
important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner,
without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.57
The numerous but highly inﬂuential errors packed into this short
passage have given rise to many misdirected fears. There is, ﬁrst
of all, no “innate tendency” toward monopoly. So long as legislation does not block free entry, new ﬁrms will always gravitate
to the areas of greatest potential advantage, which monopolists
create when they provide a price umbrella against new entrants.
Nor is it the case that freedom of contract favors the rich and
privileged—today’s top one percent. That institution allows all persons to withhold their services in a competitive market, which
means that they can never be forced to take deals that leave them
worse off. The only parties who under orthodox doctrine are under
a duty to serve are common carriers and public utilities that do
have monopoly power, which requires them to serve customers on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms precisely because
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Gaynor (2006).
Kessler (1943).
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of the want of credible alternatives for customers (rich or poor) in
these settings.58 Finally, it is always a grievous error to compare the
market power of a monopolist to the legislative power of the government. Monopolists still face downward-sloping demand curves
so that any price increase is coupled with a loss of customers. Legislatures have the power of conscription and punishment that no
monopoly ﬁrm has, and thus have a lot more leverage when the
price for nonacquiescence is a ﬁne or a jail sentence, and not just
the loss of services.
Given these systematic realities, the correct response to standardization is to ask speciﬁcally whether the antitrust law can
control any monopoly risks, and if not what other body of regulation
might be invoked to deal with it. That question also arises in other
contexts, where the results are relatively mixed,59 In these cases,
standardized protocols by ﬁrms acting alone pose no such risk, at
least no more than any other cost-saving unilateral practice. Yet the
need to collect and organize this information often requires cooperation between ﬁrms in order to encourage the efﬁcient spread
of information, which includes the creation of more extensive data
collection that allows ﬁrms to reach deﬁnitive results more quickly.
The correct answer is to allow for partial sharing of information
subject to a constraint against the standardization of prices or the
division of territories. It is just unwise to think that additional constraints are needed.60 The march toward standardization has many
powerful consequences that are adverse to the short-term ﬁnancial
position of many established players in the market who are all too
quick to use license and permit restrictions to keep out innovators.
The loose talk by Gawande and others actually plays into their hand
by propping up restrictions that keep small but inefﬁcient market
participants in place. The social response to deprofessionalization is
to welcome it, but only if it can prove itself in the marketplace. That
the phenomenon will exist seems beyond doubt. The only questions that remain are how it will manifest itself in an unregulated
environment.
4. Deprofessionalization in law
The cycle of deprofessionalization that is observed in medicine
takes the same pattern in law, albeit for very different reasons.
There are two major determinants for the need for legal services.
The ﬁrst is the ordinary private dispute, of the sort that has been
around from the beginning of organized society, that takes place
between individuals. There are disputes over the ownership of land
and chattels. There are constant contract disputes that arise out of
both business and social life. There are the harmful interactions that
result in bodily injury or property damage. But, in addition to this
category, there is another: the huge amount of legal work that arises
through government regulation at all levels. These two spheres of
action are not unrelated, for today much of the expansion in legal
activity derives from the interaction of the two. The class of external harms that has long been within the province of the tort law
now expands to cover all sorts of esthetic issues like the blocking of
views, and economic issues like competitive harms, both of which
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For discussion, see Epstein (1998).
For the defense of this view in patent law, see Hovenkamp (2008), which attacks
efforts to develop an independent doctrine of patent misuse that goes beyond that
found in the antitrust laws. Hovenkamp writes: “[T]he Federal Circuit’s position
seems incredible to someone familiar with the expansive body of antitrust doctrine,” given that “¸ 2 [of the Sherman Act] reaches every act that monopolizes or
dangerously threatens to do so.”
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For an example of the antitrust response to this problem, see United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975), where the Court notes that “the
dissemination of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.” The key point in that case is that the information sharing was necessary for
running a check-clearing operation that necessarily required cooperation across the
entire banking network.
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were not actionable under the earlier common law doctrines.61 This
expanded deﬁnition of private harms has in turn fed the creation
of regulatory devices intended to deal with them, whether through
local zoning laws, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food
and Drug Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, all of which
share so broad and diffuse a deﬁnition of harms which cannot be
attacked in only one way. To respond to these harms, the new legal
regime contemplates regulation and litigation at both the federal
and state level, which requires everyone involved with the legal
system to master four separate systems of social control and the
complex interactions among them.
This multiplicity of action in turn leads to a change in the form
of legal rules, marked chieﬂy by a decline of the bright-line rule and
the rise of the many-factored test that is invoked on questions both
of permits and licenses on the one hand, and liability on the other.
These multi-factorial decision rules in turn place greater pressure
on both public and private institutions that are charged with implementing these rules. The procedures that are now required under
both the Administrative Procedure Act and speciﬁc substance (or
in this arcane world, organic) statutes, on the one hand, and by discovery in litigation, on the other, are far more complex than anyone
had imagined when both these systems were put into place in the
great reforms of the New Deal. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
date from 1938, and the Administrative Procedure Act62 from 1946,
but in reality they are far closer in time if one accounts for the relative lack of major activity on this front during the Second World
War.
It would, however, be wrong to think that the only source of
increased legal work arises from the outgrowth of traditional activities. Hand-in-hand with the changes in the private economy are
the major expansions of various welfare and transfer programs,
most speciﬁcally Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, at the
federal level, and the increased expenditure on education at both
the federal and the state level. These programs require intensive
dealing with individual cases, but they also present major structural
disputes that themselves call into play the same kind of professional expertise that has to do with the more traditional forms of
government agency.
The advent of these developments was a great boon to the
legal profession because it brought to the fore the very kinds of
skills that command a professional’s premium: the ability to master complex bodies of technical, scientiﬁc, and economic material
in order to gain the foundation to make educated judgments about
how to handle litigation and negotiate in the shadow of the law.
In-house counsel will necessarily have less familiarity with the betthe-company type issues than an outside ﬁrm that handles such
high-stakes cases on a regular basis. That being said, there are still
relatively few ﬁrms in the market who will have sufﬁcient expertise in this area to command premium rates. Indeed, even today,
one of the serious institutional barriers to dealing effectively with
these issues is that the corporate insiders that have to make the
initial round of personnel decisions are unaware of the demands
that complex litigation places on the traditional lawyers on whom
they rely. One reason, for example, why product liability cases were
so difﬁcult to deal with in the 1970s when the expansion ﬁrst took
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place in design 63 and warning cases64 was that the major companies thought of them as negligence cases to be treated in the same
way as intersection collisions. That global judgment, however, led
to serious mistakes, as the wealth of scientiﬁc, engineering and
technical information that is needed to resolve a modern design
defect case dwarfs in complexity the question of which car had the
right of way at the intersection, just as the knowledge requirement
for the modern duty to warn case involves far more than the failure
to put a skull and crossbones on a bottle of poison.
As the pace of legislation continues, this ability to assimilate
continues to pose a major challenge, as is surely the case today
with both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the
Dodd–Frank legislation, such that compliance work has blossomed
into a ﬁeld of its own in recent times. There is little doubt that the
great rise in legal salaries over the past half-century, especially at
the top of the market,65 is in some large measure attributable to
the innovation in ﬁrm practice needed to respond to these major
initiatives at every step in the process, from legislation, through
rulemaking, through adjudication. That trend is accelerated, if anecdotal evidence is correct, by the segmentation of the market into
different service groups. I have heard more than one lawyer say that
he or she left a large national ﬁrm because of the insistence that they
charge high rates that their more modest local client base could not
afford. That reconﬁguration allows them to generate more billable
hours, and thus, ironically, to increase their annual take-home pay
by charging less, and at the same time it is likely to increase the
already high average rates at the larger ﬁrms.66 In fact, there is no
credible story of the American political economy that points to a
rapid shrinkage in overall levels of legal service.
In light of all these changes, how should we view the nature
and extent of the decline of Big Law? Part of the explanation lies in
the overall decline in business during the past recession and slow
recovery. The reduced level of activity means that fewer ﬁrms form,
the ﬁrms that do form engage in fewer transactions, and the transactions in which they engage are usually less dramatic in scope
and ambition than those in other times. But, recall that Ribstein
predicts, perhaps too pessimistically, the decline in Big Law even
after the economy returns to growth mode because the same structural factors are at stake in this area as they are everywhere else.
There are constant efforts by large corporations and other heavy
consumers of legal services to reduce the level of discretion needed
in dealing with legal matters. In part this is driven by the change
in pricing practices that tends to alter the provision of health care
services. Gone are the long associate memos that offer exhaustive
reviews of precedent, none of which gets used in any particular
case. In their stead, ﬁrms that are often asked to put some fraction of
their compensation contingent on output now converge on the key
issues much earlier in the game than they did before. In addition,
all complex litigation involves a huge level of grunt work that is no
longer done by regular law ﬁrm partners and associates. The rise of
the “contract attorney” who works for far less than ordinary associates, often in cheaper locations that are away from the main ﬁrm
ofﬁces, is now an accepted part of the legal system. Occasionally
there are “temp-to-perm” programs, but many only offer a lifeline
to a comparatively small fraction of persons. What has happened
in effect is that large law ﬁrms have adopted the same response to
peak-load issues as their clients: keep a smaller coherent core with
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the regular ﬁrm and go for outside help on a spot contract basis,
which of course subjects contract lawyers to far higher risk levels
than before.
The strategy of shrinking the professional base of the ﬁrm
continues. Just as the use of health care personnel who are not
physicians is likely to transform health care delivery, law ﬁrms
have also resorted to paralegals and technical assistants to cover
much of their work. The issue of document review, which can be so
costly, is increasingly turned over to complex computer programs
that can link across documents in ways in which no human being
can. Indeed, these systems can often trace phone calls and e-mails
to see where the latter disappear and the former pick up, which
is a good sign that sensitive matters were discussed. Outsourcing
to foreign lawyers for routine searches of statutes, regulations and
cases (much like having foreign radiologists read studies done in
the United States) is yet another technique to lower the demand in
major ﬁrms.
At the same time, the routine transactions performed by lawyers
(e.g., house closings) have become heavily automated, often by title
insurance companies, so that the cost of closings has dropped dramatically as well. The rise of computer applications to handle taxes,
wills, leases, gifts, and other standard family transactions has transformed the market as well. No one can be sure as to how far this
movement will go; nor is there any reason of policy that requires a
deﬁnitive answer, so long as regulators do not intervene to prevent
the orderly implementation of policy. The bottom line is this: Big
Law will survive, but it will be a leaner and more resourceful big
law than before. The bottom line on little law is more difﬁcult to
predict, but my guess is as follows. The corporate practice of law
is only one step removed from the LegalZooms and RocketLawyers
of this world. Allow those ﬁrms to ﬂourish, and they will intermediate between customers and lawyers by hiring those individuals
whom they think can best ﬁt into their generalized system of doing
business in ways that are as yet only dimly understood.

5. The feedback on professional education
These profound shifts in the demand for medical and legal
services will surely exert some pressures on the educational institutions that feed all sectors of both professions. On the medical side,
it is best for an outsider to be difﬁdent, but my own limited experience in teaching doctors comes from the University of Chicago,
where I have taught physicians and other health care professionals from a large range of students. Obviously, I am in no position
to question their professional competence in their chosen areas of
expertise, but what is most apparent from those sessions is how little time they have spent in their education and practice in thinking
about how, to pick just one topic, to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Terms like expected value, marginal cost, and
two kinds of error are wholly foreign to their vocabulary (but not
necessarily to all aspects of their practice). Yet knowledge of these
principles seems indispensable for designing the various protocols
that will govern medical education, especially an education that
treats the reform of the health care system as one of its topics.
Being able to understand these concepts should allow doctors and
hospitals to sharpen their judgment of how to think of “evidence
based medicine” which when properly applied could help reduce
unwise treatments and the false hopes that they can generate. But
in the hands of the wrong people, the device could just become a
tool to ration costs regardless of beneﬁts.
At one time, it may well have been necessary to have an
encyclopedic knowledge of a wide range of medical facts, but
the data sources today are so much more powerful and more
readily available that dealing with probabilities and uncertainty
is more important than memorizing the names of all the cranial
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nerves. 67 To an outsider, it is always striking how uneasy the ﬁt is
between the comprehensive examinations for entering the profession and the high degrees of specialization in research and practice
for most specialists within the ﬁeld. Other features about medical education are more troublesome. It looks as though there will
be a sharp cleavage between the highly paid specialists at the top
and the vast run of primary care physicians who will provide the
huge bulk of health care. Quite simply, the promised salaries under
government rationing with Medicare and Medicaid may make it
impossible for future doctors to ﬁnance their education out of their
future earnings,68 which could lead to a shortage of primary care
doctors when they will be even more in demand with the recent
expansion of Medicaid and the other costly reforms of the PPACA.
Whatever the situation on the medical side, the legal position is
grim. There have been a number of high-proﬁle accounts of why it
is that law schools now face what Lincoln Caplan has termed “an
existential crisis for law schools,” given the weak job market, in
which “[o]nly 55 percent of 43,725 graduates in 2011 had a lawrelated job nine months after graduation.”69 Needless to say, there
is a sharp drop in the number of applications to law school as well.70
There have also been multiple efforts to respond to these difﬁculties, including a decline in theory and an emphasis in the kinds
of skills, like ﬁlling out corporate forms, that lawyers will need in
practice. The implicit assumption behind many of these accounts is
that law schools will only survive if they change.71 The more accurate account is that the changes that they make will not in some
cases be sufﬁcient to support their survival. To teach lawyers how
to do routine work will be of no value to law students at the top
of the market who will, if anything, need to be more versatile than
ever before to serve their elite clients in those areas in which nothing less than the best professionals will do. Yet at the bottom end,
the competition from non-legal personnel will cap fees so that law
school will remain a terrible investment, unless the rise of market
intermediaries changes what people with what training work at
the mass end of the market.
The one clear prediction from these developments is that there
will be some contraction of the market which will result in the
shrinkage of some schools but not others. This contraction will
probably hit the top schools as well, with less of an effect on top
students and top professors whose abilities put them squarely in
the elite zone. Exact predictions are hard to come by, but here
is one guess. The skill set developed will be less concerned with
the preparation of routine forms, for which there is strong paralegal competition. Rather it will seek, as does the recent NYU
curricular revision, to give students a chance to work overseas or
in high-pressure environments where their practice exposure can
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complement their book knowledge.72 All students need not take
this line, nor should they be required to do so, for the key policy
implications of the current wave of law school reforms are these.
The organized bar through the American Bar Association should not
be allowed to protect its client base by tightening its accreditation
standards, by raising legal barriers to the unauthorized practice of
law, or by tightening the rules that govern the admission of foreign
students into the American bar (which have just been tightened in
New York).73 Mercantilism is the common response to changes in
market forces, and that should be stoutly resisted if at all possible.
6. Conclusion
As this article is being written, tectonic forces are working to
change the shape of both the legal and medical professions. These
changes are inevitable and for the most part welcome. The cycle
of innovation whereby experts start a process that then over time
becomes routinized is socially beneﬁcial at both stages, so that
it would be unwise to erect various barriers to the standardization and commoditization of these key services. The innovators
should be able, and will be able, to retain their advantage only by
continuing to make advances in areas that have resisted general
improvement. The real danger of abuse in this area lies not in the
ﬁrms in competitive industries that become leaders in their own
market by adapting most rapidly to these forces. It lies instead in
the protectionist responses to these changes: in trying to erect entry
barriers, by licensing or other forms of restrictions—all to insulate high-cost providers from low-cost sources of competition. The
powerful awareness of this risk was all too apparent to Larry Ribstein, who fought mightily against these trends. It is worth keeping
up that battle even after his powerful voice has been silenced.
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